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Transatlantic relations in the Johnson and Nixon eras: 
The crisis that didn’t happen – and what it suggests about the one that did.1 
 
 
Transatlantic relations were going through a deeply troubled phase in the mid-1960s.  On 
this bald fact most contemporary observers and historians seem to be able to agree.  
There is, furthermore, a degree of consensus – again between both those who lived 
through the era and those who have studied it more recently - that this malaise reflected 
the profound differences between the situation in the late 1940s when the Atlantic 
relationship had first been institutionalised and the conditions which prevailed two 
decades later.  An alliance, partnership or even ‘empire’ born at a time of US nuclear 
monopoly, near total American economic dominance, deep and generalised Western 
anxiety vis-à-vis Stalinist Russia, and a widespread  agreement amongst foreign policy-
making elites on both sides of the Atlantic that the fate of Europe was central to the 
unfolding cold war, struggled to adapt to a world of approaching nuclear parity between 
the two superpowers, dramatic European economic recovery, the steady rise of East-West 
détente, and growing US preoccupation with South East Asia seemingly at the expense of 
Europe.  The awkward reality that article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty also identified 
1969 – or NATO’s 20th anniversary – as the first point when any signatory of the Treaty 
could voluntarily withdraw from the Alliance added a further destabilizing ingredient to 
the mix.2  
 Beneath this consensus that there was indeed a problem in Transatlantic relations, 
there also lurks an element of contradiction, however.  This reflects, on the one hand, the 
growing body of archival evidence which demonstrates that many of the trends which are 
normally associated with the reassessment of US-European relations which is said to 
have occurred during Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s period in charge of US 
foreign policy were evident within the Johnson administration also. And on the other, the 
emerging consensus in the historical literature that Lyndon B. Johnson’s European policy 
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was much less ‘inactive’ and far more successful than had often been claimed.  Certainly 
the Johnson administration managed to avoid a major Transatlantic crisis in the later 
1960s.   Many of the ingredients for a crisis were present, and some dramatic disruption 
of Transatlantic relations was repeatedly predicted in the second half of the decade.  But 
contrary to expectations, no major storm occurred. 
 Investigating this crisis that did not happen has the additional merit of throwing 
up some useful leads to follow when looking in more detail – as multiple scholars are 
currently doing - at the crisis that did, namely the much more turbulent phase of 
Transatlantic relations associated with the middle years of the Nixon administration.  For 
this article will suggest that some of the factors on the European side at least which 
helped avert serious trouble in the 1960s, had gone into reverse by the 1970s and may 
hence help explain why the Nixon-Kissinger years were as problematic for Transatlantic 
relations as they are generally held to have been. 
 
There could be trouble ahead… 
The obvious starting point for this article is to recall how much talk there was about 
Transatlantic drift in the mid to late 1960s.  At one level, of course, such mutterings were 
as old as the Atlantic Alliance itself.  Even in the period of maximum European 
dependence on the United States (in both economic and security terms) some voices on 
both sides of the Atlantic had been raised against the development of close ties.  Such 
dissent had only grown as Western Europe rediscovered a degree of confidence and 
prosperity and started to feel less bound to follow Washington’s lead. European 
misgivings were also heightened by the rapidly changing military and technological 
balance of power in the cold war.  There had thus been a well-documented surge in 
European misgiving about the reliability of the US in the wake of Sputnik.3  There had 
been another after the Cuban Missile Crisis.4  And by 1964 Henry Kissinger had been 
delivering a clever series of lectures to NATO audiences analysing the multiple structural 
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tensions within the Atlantic Alliance.5  This background noise had grown more 
noticeable as the decade had advanced however. 
 One obvious contributing factor was the unpopularity amongst many Europeans 
of the United States engagement in Vietnam.  Press reports and television coverage of 
what was happening in South East Asia not only revitalised the long-standing left wing 
critique of US imperialism, but also generated a new wave of hostility towards American 
foreign policy amongst Europe’s youth.6  Disquietingly for Transatlantic relations, this 
was not confined to countries like France and Italy which had deep-rooted traditions of 
anti-US sentiment, but had also spread to West Germany and Britain.   To see the 
Amerikahaüser in Berlin and elsewhere – institutions that had once symbolised the 
closeness of US-German relations – singled out as targets by anti-American student 
protestors was an alarming indication of how popular sentiment seemed to be changing.7 
 This left-wing critique was matched by the highly vociferous Gaullist challenge 
more associated with the European right.  The details of de Gaulle’s attack on the 
structures of Atlantic cooperation have been extensively explored elsewhere.8  What 
matters, however, when setting out the difficulties for the Atlantic Alliance and the wider 
Transatlantic relationship is that support for the  French President’s sentiments was never 
restricted solely to France, but occurred in small but influential pockets in the Federal 
Republic, Italy and Belgium.9  Portions of the right-wing press in all three countries 
therefore picked up de Gaulle’s scepticism about the reliability of America’s security 
guarantee, his dissatisfaction with the unequal nature of NATO, and his desire for a 
greater European voice in East-West relations.  Diluted versions of both left-wing and the 
Gaullist doubts about the Atlantic Alliance also percolated down into the centrist press 
across Europe.  A succession of editorial pieces questioning NATO’s solidity and future 
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was the inevitable result.  Similarly, de Gaulle’s attacks on the basic inequality of the 
Bretton Woods monetary system and his complaint that the US was allowed to behave in 
a more fiscally irresponsible fashion than any other state, struck a responsive chord 
amongst many European bankers and government officials.  In Bonn, for instance, 
anxious US officials touring European capitals in the wake of the French President’s 
highly public assault were given a degree of reassurance that the Germans would not 
slavishly follow the French but also firmly warned by Karl Blessing, the President of the 
Bundesbank, ‘the US deficit cannot last much longer and we [the US] should understand 
this. Europe will not take much more in dollar holdings.’10  It was thus not just the 
French, nor just student radicals, who believed that America was mismanaging its status 
as the economic and military leader of the Western world and deriving unfair advantages 
from its pivotal position.  Sentiments of this sort, moreover, help explain why most of the 
European Community member state governments were initially ready to join forces with 
the French in the late 1960s attempt to re-balance the rules and institutions of the world 
financial system.11  Mutual incomprehension across the Atlantic was present in the 
financial sphere, as much as in that of security. 
 Transatlantic tensions were further fuelled by episodes such as the Non-
Proliferation Treaty where superpower agreement was followed by multiple West-West 
disagreements, notably between the United States and West Germany.12  Not only was 
the NPT the result of bilateral dialogue between the superpowers and hence something 
which reinforced Europeans’ sense of marginalisation in cold war affairs.  The fears of 
US-Soviet condominium in world affairs which would be so much a symptom of 
Transatlantic tension in the 1970s, were thus already evident in the mid to late-1960s.  In 
the German case, the NPT was also definitive confirmation of the country’s prohibition 
from holding nuclear weapons.  It thus emphasised not merely the gap between the 
Federal Republic and the superpowers, but also Germany’s military inferiority vis-à-vis 
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her European neighbours Britain and France.  At a time of growing German self-
confidence and awareness of its economic out-performance of both the UK and France, 
this was a bitter pill to swallow.  In the heated domestic German debate which 
surrounded the NPT, the Treaty was compared to the Morganthau Plan – the US wartime 
scheme for dismembering Germany.13 
 Such European voices meanwhile were given added credibility by the increasing 
doubts about Washington’s European engagement at the level of US opinion.  The most 
celebrated expression of doubt was probably Senator Mansfield’s long-lasting campaign 
to use Congressional votes to force the US government to reduce the number of troops 
stationed in Western Europe.14  But it was a problem which reached well beyond a 
somewhat maverick senator and affected a much wider portion of US public opinion.  
When President Johnson met the German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger in April 1967 
he expressed concern about some of the hostility and mistrust of the US which he had 
been informed about in the European press and then continued: ‘While this was going on 
in Germany there was a similar type of "unfaithful husband-wife" thinking towards 
Germany in the United States. People were saying to themselves: Why should we 
continue to spend over a million dollars? Why should we keep on maintaining our troops 
there? Why should we not let them handle their own defense? They are grown up now. 
They have rebuilt their countries. They can take care of themselves. They have a better 
balance of payments situation. Why should we stay if de Gaulle feels we should get out, 
if the Germans doubt us? Why should we not talk to them in terms of the 20th century, in 
terms of planes and rockets rather than in 19th century terms of ground troops? If they are 
looking for defense protection by the French, why not let them do just that?’15 
 Under the surface moreover there were real elements of doubt creeping into the 
Transatlantic relationship, on both sides of the Atlantic.  Thus, for example, US Secretary 
of Treasury Henry Fowler’s critique of the ‘inward-looking’ Community which 
disregarded US economic interests foreshadowed some of the criticism of Europe’s 
economic approach associated with the Nixon rethink and in particular with Secretary 
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John Connelly’s approach. In the aftermath of an inconclusive National Security Council 
discussion of US policy to Europe in 1967, Fowler wrote to the President: ‘If the United 
States is to be effective in partnership with Western Europe and we are to avoid a two-
bloc system in the Free World, the relative burdens much be attuned to financial viability.  
The purpose and thrust of our major political and diplomatic effort much be to effect a 
more viable and durable financial partnership than our diplomacy has provided in the last 
decade since the Common Market was established.’16  Likewise other members of the 
Johnson administration were increasingly outspoken about the need for greater ‘burden 
sharing’ between Europe and America and the seeming trend for Europe to disregard 
global dangers (notably in Vietnam) in favour of tending its own garden.  Walt Rostow 
for instance commented that ‘Europe is neglecting the world.  It is in an isolationist 
cycle.’17 The gap between the US with its global interests and Europe with its regional 
ones of which Kissinger would famously and controversially speak in 1973, was in other 
words already perceived by many in Washington five or six years before the Year of 
Europe speech.18 
 Likewise, a certain tendency to ignore the institutions of multilateral Europe was 
already visible in Washington well before the hand-over from Johnson to Nixon.  Nixon’s 
failure to make time to see Jean Rey, the European Commission President, when the 
latter visited Washington in 1969 – an incident which caused a great deal of soul-
searching in Brussels – could easily have occurred under LBJ.19  The latter had been 
highly reluctant to meet Rey two years earlier, delegating the task of receiving the new 
Commission President to his Vice President, and had needed to be persuaded by Rostow 
to make space in his diary.20  Again therefore a trend later denounced as an unfortunate 
characteristic of the Nixon/Kissinger approach to foreign affairs, had been foreshadowed 
within the Johnson administration. 
 All of this helped ensure that early writing about the period did tend to argue that 
the Johnson years were a problematic time for US-European relations.  There had been 
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no major blow-up perhaps, but Johnson’s mind was elsewhere – whether focusing on 
domestic priorities or on the ever more preoccupying situation in Vietnam - and his skills 
were ill-suited for the niceties of West-West diplomacy.  Relations with his major 
Western European contemporaries had thus been generally poor: the LBJ-Wilson rapport 
was distant and cool compared with that between Macmillan and Kennedy, while the 
Texan President’s handling of Ludwig Erhard, the German Chancellor, had contributed 
significantly to the latter’s fall from power in 1966.  Relations with de Gaulle, which 
would always have been problematic, were meanwhile made even more difficult by the 
total lack of cultural understanding between the two men.21  Lawrence Kaplan’s book on 
NATO would be a typical example of this trend.  Recently, however this viewpoint has 
been stood on its head. The dominant view of recent scholarly literature on Transatlantic 
relations in the later 1960s has been that LBJ was much less ineffective when it came to 
Europe than has normally been asserted. 
 The revisionism on this began with Schwartz’s book Lyndon Johnson and 
Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam.  This did its best to demonstrate that LBJ neither 
ignored, nor mishandled relations with his European allies.  The links with Germany and 
Britain continued to be quite intensive and generally cordial, and the French problem, 
while certainly not solved, was at least contained and prevented from infecting the 
Atlantic alliance more widely.22  The trend continued with Andreas Wenger’s work on 
the Harmel exercise, which again painted a picture of US activism and effectiveness on 
this issue at odds with the traditional caricature.23  Andrew Priest’s study of Anglo-
American relations chimed in with much the same conclusion, while Hubert 
Zimmermann’s detailed study of the off-set issue, while illustrating quite how fraught 
these negotiations proved to be, ultimately presented them as an obstacle that was 
overcome, rather than one which did lasting damage to US-German relations.24  And this 
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trend has been given its latest, and most convincing manifestation, in James Ellison’s 
very persuasive study in Anglo-American cooperation to thwart de Gaulle.  This 
concludes that ‘in their activities, separately and jointly, the Americans and British had 
played leading roles in stabilising the West in 1967.’25  Most of the recent research in 
other words has tended to vindicate Walt Rostow who had written to LBJ as he stepped 
down in 1969 to compliment him on leaving NATO ‘in extremely good shape for your 
successor, given de Gaulle, Vietnam, balance of payments, etc’. 
 Furthermore, this historical judgement is borne out by the actual record of events 
in the later 1960s which does not really provide much evidence of any serious breakdown 
at a Transatlantic level.  On the contrary, de Gaulle’s challenge had been countered and 
turned to NATO’s advantage through the Harmel exercise.  The alliance seemed 
genuinely to have reinvented itself and was actively exploring its new détente vocation 
and plotting a joint response to persistent Eastern Bloc calls for a European Security 
conference.  No country would hence avail itself of the twenty year abrogation clause 
which had been included in the original 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. Relations also 
remained strong between the US and the EEC, the Six having not only proved capable of 
delivering an acceptable conclusion of the Kennedy Round, but also of complying with 
the subsequent US request to speed up the implementation of the trade accord.26  The 
ongoing closeness of ties between the European Commission and Washington had also 
been seemingly confirmed by the GATT negotiations.27  And the Bretton Woods system, 
while still unreformed, had a least temporarily weathered the storms of 1968 and 1969.28  
European support for the US dollar reached its apogee with the Blessing Note of March 
1967 in which the President of the Bundesbank undertook not to seek to convert 
Germany’s substantial dollar holdings into gold.  But even after this seeming 
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demonstration of German strength and US weakness (which in fact did little more than 
make more widely known a pattern of German behaviour towards the United States 
which had prevailed since the early 1960s) none but the French mounted a very 
systematic challenge to the dollar’s leading role.  And the French found themselves 
steadily less able to corral the Six into a unified bloc in 1967-8 as their parallel 
disagreements with their European ‘partners’ over other subjects proliferated.29 
 So why was there no crisis?  Why were all the doom-mongers – but also those 
more dispassionate analysts who discerned deep structural difficulties in a partnership 
forged during the high point of the cold war, but now exposed to the very different 
stresses and strains of détente – wrong (or at least premature) in their pessimism? 
 Part of the answer doubtless lies on the American side and the nature of the LBJ 
approach.  This is a field which the present author intends to explore over the next few 
years, but about which he still knows far too little yet to venture very much by way of an 
explanation.  But this article will also contend that there were a number of factors on the 
European side which contributed to the crisis that did not happen (and the disappearance 
of which hence contributed to the one that did during the Nixon-Kissinger era).  And it is 
hence on these European elements in the overall answer that the rest of this contribution 
will dwell. 
 The first European ingredient which helped prevent a major breakdown in 
Transatlantic relations from occurring during the Johnson years was the perversely 
unifying effect of de Gaulle.   The French President certainly wanted to be seen as 
someone who was seeking to weaken the solidity of the Atlantic Alliance and of the US 
leadership role in Europe.  He was also regarded by his contemporaries, and has been 
treated by most historians, as a genuine threat to the Atlanticist status quo.  But in many 
ways the extremism of the positions which he adopted towards the Americans and the 
tactlessness which he displayed towards his potential allies elsewhere in Europe repelled 
these last and drove them back towards Washington.  The would-be liberator of Europe 
from the US yoke, may in effect, have helped consolidate rather than weaken 
Transatlantic ties. 
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 In the nuclear field, de Gaulle’s relentless attacks on US strategic doctrine and the 
reliability of the American guarantee, confronted those who were genuinely interested in 
the development of a European nuclear force, with an increasingly stark choice between a 
very powerful and fully extent US nuclear umbrella, and a putative and much less 
powerful French force de frappe.  No serious military analyst could recommend the latter 
over the former.  In Germany, for instance, that minority who were genuinely tempted by 
the idea of transforming the French nuclear force into a genuinely independent European 
deterrent, found it hard to overcome the widespread awareness that Paris could offer little 
more than what was condescendingly dubbed a ‘Sahara-Bömbchen’ – a diminutive bomb 
tested in the North African desert.30  Choosing this ‘little bang’ as Erhard put it, over the 
US’ ‘big bang’, made very little sense.31 
 Politically, the French leader’s high-handed manner convinced most of his would-
be partners that any European cooperation in which they participated would not be 
European cooperation at all, but simply the replacement of US leadership with French 
leadership.  And again powerful and distant Washington, for all its flaws, was a distinctly 
preferable alternative to a France which was arrogant, tactless, and actually not really 
very powerful at all.  And economically de Gaulle’s overstated campaign against the 
Bretton Woods system turned what might have become a genuinely prescient European 
critique of both US fiscal irresponsibility and the asymmetry of the international 
monetary system, into a rant with which few other Europeans wanted to be closely 
associated.  The notion of returning to a reliance on gold as the central pivot of the 
system also gave unintentional force to the standard anti-Gaullist line that the French 
President was a backward looking statesman whose views were more appropriate for the 
nineteenth century than the twentieth. Furthermore, when the French did moderate their 
viewpoint somewhat and managed to persuade their partners to join them on a concerted 
quest to lessen the perceived under-representation of Europe in the IMF and the other 
Bretton Woods institutions, Paris then undermined the collective effort by picking new 
fights with its monetary allies over unrelated issues like British EEC membership.32 
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 De Gaulle’s overall effect was hence to drive many of those Europeans who 
harboured genuine misgivings about certain aspects of US leadership and the Atlantic 
system, back into the arms of the Americans.  As one Italian diplomat would put it in 
early 1963 (straight after the first Gaullist crisis hit Europe), ‘Il padrone più ricco e più 
lontano è sempre il migliore.’ (The best boss is always he who is richest and further 
away.)33 And this judgement would persist until 1969. France was just too close and too 
threadbare a pretender seriously to challenge US dominance. 
 A second important, if unintentional, stabilising factor was the non-appearance of 
any form of European political unity.  Washington always claimed that it supported the 
notion of Western Europe developing a greater degree of political as well as economic 
unity.  Kennedy’s ringing ‘declaration of interdependence’ speech in Philadelphia on July 
4, 1962 asserted, for instance:  
We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its 
progress has been the basic object of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe 
that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common 
defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining 
with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of 
commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all 
economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with 
whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks 
of building and defending a community of free nations.34 
 
And for some at least, especially in the State Department, this was almost certainly 
sincere.35  But as some perceptive US observers recognised the actual appearance of a 
structure which might coordinate the stance of European countries could pose serious 
questions about the existing Transatlantic relationship.  As Lawrence Kaplan put it in 
early 1965: ‘we would be concerned if any such negotiation weakened rather than 
strengthened NATO, were to lead to an inward-orientated “small Europe” with the 
characteristic of excluding the British for all time, did not promote European integration 
                                                 
33
 Cited by Leopoldo Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l’apertura a sinistra.  Importanza e limiti della presenza 
americana in Italia (Rome: Laterza, 1999), p.577 
34
 The text of the speech is available at 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03Indepe
ndenceHall07041962.htm (accessed 7.10.2008) 
35
 For a discussion of the divide between ‘Europeanists’ and ‘Atlanticists’ within US foreign policy making 
circules, see Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1993) 194-201 
by strengthening the existing Communities, and if they ignored the crucial collateral 
policy of Atlantic partnership.’36 
 Throughout the 1960s the European desire for such a structure seldom 
disappeared entirely.  The well-known Fouchet Plan of 1961 (itself a formalisation of 
French ideas expressed as early as 1959) was thus followed by multiple German, Italian 
and Belgian calls for greater foreign policy coordination during the mid-1960s, tentative 
British plans for reviving the Fouchet Plan as an anti-de Gaulle weapon in 1968, and a 
short-lived attempt pioneered by Harmel in 1969 to use the seven-nation Western 
European Union for this purpose.37  But none of these ventures ever got off the drawing 
board.  As a result, for the duration of the 1960s, the US never had to contend with a 
coordinated European stance on any political issues - in marked contradistinction to trade 
matters and to a lesser extent monetary issues where such coordination occurred and did 
have a serious impact upon the Transatlantic balance of power. 
 Even an increasingly distracted America, more concerned with events in South 
East Asia than with a seemingly stable Europe, had more than enough clout and 
diplomatic savvy to dismiss unilateral foreign policy moves by individual European 
states.   The meagre results of the multiple European attempts to mediate in the Vietnam 
War during the 1960s bear testament to this reality.38  European political disunity hence 
contributed to the easy continuation of US leadership and also, therefore, to the stability 
of the Atlantic Alliance during the Johnson era. 
 A third contributing factor was the very slow British acceptance of the status of a 
European power.  Viewed with hindsight, the 1960s can be read as an era when 
successive British governments gradually came to terms with the impossibility of the UK 
retaining its global role and transferred an increasing amount of their attention and 
ambition to the European scene.39  Indeed even at the time many British leaders were 
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slowly and hesitantly coming to the conclusion that their future lay in Europe and not as 
global power. Macmillan began the trend, Wilson would continue it, and Edward Heath 
would take it to its logical conclusion in the early 1970s.  But this change took more or 
less the whole decade to occur.  The British governments themselves took a while to 
swallow the full implications.  The arrival of a Labour government in 1964 delayed 
matters for at least a couple of years while Harold Wilson had to ‘re-learn’ the lessons 
that Macmillan had already been forced to swallow.40 British public opinion also took 
time to adjust.  And most fundamentally the alternative policy – that of ‘entering Europe’ 
– was twice barred by de Gaulle. 
 As a result, for much of the 1960s Britain found itself in an odd free-floating 
position somewhere between the US and continental Europe.  This was not a comfortable 
position to occupy and it led to a great deal of soul-searching and irritation on the part of 
those responsible for charting the UK’s foreign policy.  But paradoxically this mid-
Atlantic position did both allow and encourage the British to play the role of intermediary 
at several potentially awkward moments in Transatlantic relations, notably that in 1966-7 
analysed by Ellison.41  Furthermore, the non-resolution of the Britain and Europe 
question distracted many of those who might otherwise have been able to give thought to 
evolving Transatlantic relations, encouraged the postponement of any serious Atlantic 
rethink until the European architecture was clearer, and added a further obstacle to the 
development of European political union, since several countries, notably the Dutch, 
insisted in what is sometimes called le préalable anglais – i.e. the insistence that British 
involvement was a precondition for any move towards European foreign policy 
coordination.42 
 A fourth factor was the relatively inconsequential nature of Western European 
contacts with the Eastern bloc.  The 1960s were a time when multiple leaders, from de 
Gaulle to Wilson, sought to take advantage of détente to show that Europe could still 
have an impact on East-West affairs.  Their collective impact, however, was minimal.  De 
Gaulle was perhaps the highest profile, but while his visits to the Eastern Bloc were PR 
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coups, their substantive outcomes disappointed the French and were seen as of little 
consequence by both Moscow itself and by the satellites.43  The one country which could 
have had a serious impact on East-West relations – West Germany – was still hamstrung 
by its internal debate about how far such dialogue could go.44  But while the unwinding 
of the Hallstein Doctrine was apparent from the mid-1960s onwards and the internal SPD 
reflection about how different Germany’s approach to the Eastern bloc should be was 
already far advanced, a genuinely effective neue Ostpolitik would have to await 1969 and 
the assumption of the Chancellorship by Willy Brandt.45 
 Meanwhile the other possible way in which Europe could have had a major 
impact upon East-West relations, namely the engagement of multilateral détente was also 
impossible until the early 1970s.  Serious Western consideration of a European security 
conference had begun before the 1960s came to an end.46  But it would take several years 
and multiple complex preconditions before such an event could open. The area of cold 
war politics where the US was likely to be most sensitive, namely that of East-West 
relations, therefore remained something of a superpower chasse gardée throughout the 
decade.  A few individual European statesmen did try to get involved.  But they had 
precious little real impact and in no sense disturbed either superpower. 
 A fifth rather more short term factor might be added to the list in the form of 
Soviet actions in crushing the Prague Spring.  For while the 1968 crisis did not interrupt 
for long the movement at both superpower and European levels towards greater East-
West détente, it did serve temporarily to revive fears of Soviet military power, and hence 
highlight the residual military utility of NATO.47   It thus provided an additional reason 
why the 1969 reform or withdrawal opportunity within the Alliance was allowed to go 
past without any country making an attempt to use it.   The USSR’s brutal suppression of 
the Prague Spring also underlined the ineffective results of de Gaulle’s efforts to build 
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bridges towards the Eastern bloc.  The French President’s foreign policy radicalism had 
already been hard hit by the Paris évenements of May 1968 and by the steady 
accumulation of resentment towards Gaullist France which had robbed it of any European 
allies in particular.  But it was the end of the Prague Spring which signalled most clearly 
the General’s demise as a serious would-be threat to the status quo.  This too brought a 
short term rise in the stability of the Western bloc. 
 The Prague effect would not last long, however, and all four other factors 
mentioned would soon go into reverse.  Between 1969 and 1971, de Gaulle would resign, 
European Political Cooperation would be launched, Britain would appear to take a firm 
(although, as it turned out, far from definitive) decision for European engagement, and 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the start of decisive moves towards the beginning of multilateral 
détente would signal the beginning of an important European component of East-West 
dialogue.  This would therefore suggest that when historians seek to understand why 
Transatlantic relations became that much more turbulent during the Nixon/Kissinger 
period than they had been under Johnson, they should seek their answer not simply in the 
changed attitudes of the American government (vital though these undoubtedly were) but 
also in a radically different set of conditions in Western Europe.   
